Apply by doing:  
	cd /usr/src
	patch -p0 < 007_ssl.patch

And then rebuild and install OpenSSL:
	rm -fr /usr/obj/lib/libssl
	cd lib/libssl
	make obj     
	make depend
	make
	make install


Index: lib/libssl/src/crypto/mem.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/mem.c,v
retrieving revision 1.6
diff -u -p -r1.6 mem.c
--- lib/libssl/src/crypto/mem.c	2002/09/14 11:18:02	1.6
+++ lib/libssl/src/crypto/mem.c	2003/02/22 04:58:05
@@ -251,6 +251,8 @@ void *CRYPTO_malloc_locked(int num, cons
 	{
 	void *ret = NULL;
 
+	if (num < 0) return NULL;
+
 	allow_customize = 0;
 	if (malloc_debug_func != NULL)
 		{
@@ -283,6 +285,8 @@ void *CRYPTO_malloc(int num, const char 
 	{
 	void *ret = NULL;
 
+	if (num < 0) return NULL;
+
 	allow_customize = 0;
 	if (malloc_debug_func != NULL)
 		{
@@ -305,6 +309,8 @@ void *CRYPTO_realloc(void *str, int num,
 
 	if (str == NULL)
 		return CRYPTO_malloc(num, file, line);
+
+	if (num < 0) return NULL;
 
 	if (realloc_debug_func != NULL)
 		realloc_debug_func(str, NULL, num, file, line, 0);
Index: lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/src/lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c,v
retrieving revision 1.7
diff -u -p -r1.7 s3_pkt.c
--- lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c	2002/09/10 16:31:57	1.7
+++ lib/libssl/src/ssl/s3_pkt.c	2003/02/22 04:58:05
@@ -238,6 +238,8 @@ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
 	unsigned int mac_size;
 	int clear=0;
 	size_t extra;
+	int decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 0;
+	unsigned char *mac = NULL;
 
 	rr= &(s->s3->rrec);
 	sess=s->session;
@@ -353,8 +355,11 @@ again:
 			/* SSLerr() and ssl3_send_alert() have been called */
 			goto err;
 
-		/* otherwise enc_err == -1 */
-		goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
+		/* Otherwise enc_err == -1, which indicates bad padding
+		 * (rec->length has not been changed in this case).
+		 * To minimize information leaked via timing, we will perform
+		 * the MAC computation anyway. */
+		decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
 		}
 
 #ifdef TLS_DEBUG
@@ -380,28 +385,46 @@ printf("\n");
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
 			goto f_err;
 #else
-			goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
+			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
 #endif			
 			}
 		/* check the MAC for rr->input (it's in mac_size bytes at the tail) */
-		if (rr->length < mac_size)
+		if (rr->length >= mac_size)
 			{
+			rr->length -= mac_size;
+			mac = &rr->data[rr->length];
+			}
+		else
+			{
+			/* record (minus padding) is too short to contain a MAC */
 #if 0 /* OK only for stream ciphers */
 			al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT);
 			goto f_err;
 #else
-			goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
+			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
+			rr->length = 0;
 #endif
 			}
-		rr->length-=mac_size;
 		i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0);
-		if (memcmp(md,&(rr->data[rr->length]),mac_size) != 0)
+		if (mac == NULL || memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0)
 			{
-			goto decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac;
+			decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac = 1;
 			}
 		}
 
+	if (decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac)
+		{
+		/* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
+		 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'.  But unless a decryption
+		 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
+		 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
+		 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */
+		al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
+		goto f_err;
+		}
+
 	/* r->length is now just compressed */
 	if (s->expand != NULL)
 		{
@@ -443,14 +466,6 @@ printf("\n");
 
 	return(1);
 
-decryption_failed_or_bad_record_mac:
-	/* Separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0,
-	 * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'.  But unless a decryption
-	 * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway,
-	 * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this
-	 * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via logfile) */
-	al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC;
-	SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
 f_err:
 	ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al);
 err: